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In the October 1966 issue of this Journal, W. M. Warren argues that
through political pressure, trade unions were successful in raising wages in
Nigeria during the period 1939 to 1960. He sets out his intention as follows:
It will be argued in the present article that however prevalent [its]
internal weakness and external difficulties may have been, the Nigerian
trade union movement has been able substantially to counteract their
debilitating effects by mobilizing political sources of strength which have
enabled it to raise the real wages of its membership and of urban wage
employees generally.'
He concludes his article by "summarizing the sources and economic effects
of Nigerian trade union strength" as follows:
In Nigeria between 1939 and 1960, the actual and potential strength of
the wage earning classes in the urban areas permitted the trade unions
to mobilize political sources of strength and thus to counteract the
handicaps under which they were operating, of severe internal weak-
nesses and unfavorable economic conditions, especially in the labor
market. As a result, the trade unions have, in certain periods and over
these years generally, been effective in raising real wages.2
This conclusion seems to bear out what is a general view-that labor
organizations in the less developed countries are major influences on wage
behavior, and that their activity explains certain important and wide-
spread phenomena: rising real wages coupled with stagnant or declining
employment, and declining internal agricultural (rural-urban) terms of
trade.
Now it is true that wage rates for unskilled wage earners have become
unmoored from the market, so to speak, in much of the underdeveloped
world. Government wage policies and social policies have, since World
War II in particular, become major determinants of wage behavior in these
areas. The factors influencing government wage decisions, such as concern
over industrial unrest, rising consumer price levels, the political influence
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of labor organizations, and trade union capacity to extend government
wage decisions to private employers are therefore relevant to under-
standing what happens to wages in the less developed countries.
Because Mr. Warren is concerned with these aspects of wage deter-
mination, his paper raises interesting questions, not only about the specific
case of Nigeria, but also about more general issues of methodology in these
matters. In my view his analysis is wrong about Nigeria and inadequate in
its general treatment of the problem.
Mr. Warren first of all makes so many exceptions to his central
argument about the trade union political impact on wage levels that it is
hard to see how he came to his conclusion from the discussion contained
in the body of the article. It is indeed hard to see how a careful reader, even
if he knew nothing about the subject, could avoid the opposite-and in my
view-the correct conclusion: that the Nigerian labor movement's impact
on wages via political pressures was negligible in most of the period under
consideration. Secondly, Mr. Warren treats historical facts with a disturb-
ing casualness. He makes assertions about the political significance of the
Nigerian labor movement, for example, on the basis of the most fragile
"evidence"; and he makes statements about the behavior of political
parties (such as the Action Group in 1954) which, if true, has escaped the
attention of the most careful students of Nigerian politics. Finally, Mr.
Warren proceeds without a nod to the basic conceptual problems involved
in any attempt to evaluate the impact of trade unions on wage levels. It is
hard enough, as students of this problem in the advanced countries know,
to determine the nature and extent of the trade union impact on wages
through collective bargaining. When trade union political pressure, not
only actual but "potential," is put into the wage determination equation,
then it is obvious that exceptionally difficult methodological problems are
raised, since every public sector wage decision can conceivably be aimed at
heading off "potential" pressure. Mr. Warren does not consider these
difficulties. He does not even make one distinction which is evidently
necessary-between the influence of trade unions as institutions, and the
influence of urban wage earners as an unorganized mass. A wage decision
designed to deal with potential industrial unrest may have little or nothing
to do with trade union pressures.
These problems, in any event, usually make it difficult or impossible
to categorically deny that the political pressures of unions or of urban
wage earning groups have affected wage levels. It is precisely because
Nigeria is one of the few countries where it seems possible to say that the
unions have had little effect on wages that Mr. Warren's contrary con-
clusion demands closer analysis.
Let us look at the methodological problem first. There is in Nigeria a
system of wage determination such that the key wage rate in the economy
is the rate paid by the government to its unskilled labor; changes in
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government's unskilled labor rate are the main determinants of changes in
the general level of wages and the wage structure. The institutional arrange-
ment through which the government rates are changed is the independent
commission, appointed periodically by government to make recommenda-
tions on wage changes. Warren's argument is that the political pressure or
influence of trade unions led government to higher wage awards than were
indicated by conditions in the labor market, and (though he doesn't make
this point explicit) higher awards than would have been made in the
absence of trade unions.
It doesn't take much reflection to see the problems involved in any
attempt to demonstrate the truth or error of such a proposition. The main
problem is, of course, that government wage decisions, like all public
sector decisions, are the consequence of a tangled network of causal factors,
and that it is exceedingly difficult to isolate and evaluate the weight of
individual causal elements.
How can we go about testing whether the organized labor movement
in a given country has had "significant" impact on changes in wage levels?
Putting to one side the problem of defining what a "significant" impact is,
the obvious first step is to identify the main factors influencing wage level
changes. A long list of such factors can be drawn up: changes in investment
and output, in labor force participation, in productivity, prices, or profits;
the structure of factor and products markets; government social and wage
policies; the timing and extent of union organization;-union wage policies;
and so on. Although most of these are interrelated, they can be grouped
for convenience into three categories: market forces, government policies,
and trade union action. Market forces are those working directly through
the supply and demand for labor-changes in employment and unemploy-
ment, in productivity, prices, and profits. Government wage policies refer
to decisions directly affecting wages-minimum wage policies and salary
policy in the public sector. Trade union pressures are of two kinds:
economic pressure exercised directly on employers through collective
bargaining, and those expressed through the political process, which would
include varied activities such as lobbying, demonstrations, riots, threats,
influence over political allies.
Even this abbreviated and simplified listing of factors affecting wage
changes indicates the highly intractable nature of the problem at hand:
how to isolate trade union effects from other factors in the conditions
typical in less developed countries.
It is usually not too hard to evaluate the influence of market forces,
even though this is not without problems. Because there is almost nowhere
in the underdeveloped world meaningful unemployment data, and the
concept itself is shaky, estimates of the state of the labor market must be
based on qualitative considerations and on data of recorded employment.
If the volume of employment is rising relatively rapidly, employers gener-
ally complain of labor scarcity, and turnover rates are high, then some
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market pressure on wages can be presumed. While this doesn't tell us
much, it tells us something. If, for example, wages rise in the face of
stagnant or declining employment, and amidst general talk of growing
unemployment, it can be presumed that the wage rise is not related to
labor market forces. Similarly-and this point is made by Warren-if
wage structure changes occur in directions contrary to expectations based
on qualitative knowledge of the labor market (for example, skill differen-
tials narrow when total employment is rising slowly or not at all, or there
is generalized scarcity of skilled workers), this can be taken as evidence of
nonmarket forces at work.
It is thus possible to rule out strong market influences on wage
behavior under certain conditions, as Warren properly does for Nigeria
for most of the period 1939-60. Where the ticklish problems arise is in
trying to separate the influence of government policy from trade union
political pressures. For here we must ultimately go into the sources of
political decision making, and this is a conceptual nightmare. Why does a
government raise statutory minimum wages or the wages of its own
unskilled employees by X percent in year Y? It is not enough to say that it
does so because consumer prices have risen. It can, of course, choose to let
real wages fall, since unskilled labor is abundant even at the lower real
wage. Nor is it enough to say that the social policy of the government in
question aims at protecting the real wages of low income wage earners, or
at raising wages to the level of "minimum human needs." There still
remain questions about why the rate of progress toward their achievement
is slow or fast.
To clarify the range of causal forces in presence, it is useful to list the
possible noneconomic reasons which might lead a government to grant a
general wage increase.
(1) The increase might result from ideological preconception or from
moral sentiments, from the ideas on social justice shared by ruling elites.
These groups or classes might believe that it is "right" and "fair" to
protect low wage earners against reductions in real income resulting from
rising price levels, or-more positively-to raise the level of minimum
wages to a level which is closer to meeting "minimum needs."
(2) The increase could be a response to unorganized dissatisfaction
and discontent of which there has been some objective indication such as
rioting or demonstrations.
(3) The increase could be "pre-emptive" in character, aimed at
heading off potential discontent. In such cases there would be no unusual
expression of discontent by wage earners, but the political leadership
would have reason to expect such discontent, and fear it. In the category of
pre-emptive wage increases, there are really two subgroups-the first
aimed at the organized urban masses, the second aimed at preventing an
organized labor movement from capitalizing on potential discontent to
strengthen its political position.
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(4) The increase could be of a more positive sort, designed to win
friends for the ruling party or groups, rather than simply at preventing
discontent. These popularity type increases also can be divided into two
subtypes: those aimed at the wage earning population without regard for
its real or presumed trade union spokesman, and those aimed at winning
favor among trade union organizations and their leaders.
(5) The increase might be in response to organized pressure by trade
unions and trade union leaders-by lobbying in party councils or adminis-
trative corridors, by systematic strike campaigns and organized demon-
strations, or by alliances of trade unions with political parties.
Many fine lines are obviously involved in this kind of classification.
It is also clear that any given wage decision is "explainable" by more than
one "cause." But the exercise is not without benefit. Aside from suggesting
that complexity of possible factors underlying any politically inspired
wage decisions, it provides some framework for analyzing the significance
of the trade union impact on government wage decisions.
With this framework in mind, let us turn to Mr. Warren's argument. He
divides the real wage history of Nigeria between 1939 and 1960 into four
subperiods or episodes. Between 1939 and 1946 real wages appeared to
have been more or less maintained. They fell between 1946 and 1950; rose
between 1950 and 1956; and fell again between 1956 and 1960.
Now what is strange about the behavior of wages during these differ-
ent periods is that, except in the wartime episode, they do not show what
Mr. Warren says they show. First of all, in two of the periods (1946-50
and 1956-60), real wages actually fell. In these two periods, clearly, neither
trade unions nor anything else were able to "effectively raise real wages."
Secondly, in the one postwar period when wages did rise (1950-55), trade
union activity, whether political or other, had virtually nothing to do with
it. The rise was due to competitive wage increases granted by the regionally
based political parties. It was quite clearly a rise of the type mentioned
above in category (4): a popularity-winning type of increase, arising out of
an election campaign; it was aimed at wage earners as a group and not
designed to respond to unusual discontent. There is not the slightest
evidence that it was dictated by a desire to appease trade union demands
or to win trade union institutional favor.
Mr. Warren recognizes the basic origin of the 1954-55 wage increases.
He writes:
... the competitive wage fixing of 1954-1955 was rather a special case,
involving as it did initiative from above by the regional governments
(page 30).
But then he goes on to say:
However, in this case, "classical" elements of a defensive reaction to the
threat of radicalization of the trade unions and the urban wage earners
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were present. In a national context, the wage increases granted by the
federal, Eastern, and Northern governments were a defensive response,
and one moreover designed to head off an attempt to gain working class
support by the more radically oriented Action Group. Further, although
the initiative was governmental, it was an initiative directed deliberately
to a situation known to be shaped and partly dominated by the trade
unions which were, after the autumn of 1953, nationally strong, militant,
and once more united.
Now, of the many comments possible about this statement, the kindest
is that it is just plain wrong. Warren's "evidence," in a footnote, is that
before the 1954 federal elections, a particular group of Marxist intellectuals
individually joined the Action Group (the political party dominant in the
Western Region), that these intellectuals had been "closely linked" to the
Nigerian Labor Congress (an ephemeral radical-dominated central labor
organization), and that they believed in a "trade union base for left wing
political activity." 3
Let us be clear about how intellectually objectionable a procedure is
involved here, and what great violence is done to historical reality. We
have a set of historical events: the granting of substantial wage increases
by the various governments in Nigeria in 1954 and 1955. The apparent
explanation is political competition between regionally based political
parties, since the increases followed campaign pledges; and once one
region had increased its wage rates, it was practically impossible for the
other regional governments to desist. There were no evident signs of un-
rest; it was, indeed, precisely because the "social and political conditions
for revolutionary action seemed less auspicious in 1954 than previously ...
[that the radical intellectuals] agreed that it would be more realistic . . . to
join one of the two major parties in Nigeria." 4 In spite of this, Mr.
Warren asserts that the wage increases were a "defensive response"
designed to head off an Action Group attempt to win working class sup-
port, and that this is demonstrated by the decision of a few radical intel-
lectuals to join the Action Group in 1954.
The implicit assumptions involved here are: (1) that the entry of the
radicals into the Action Group was in some meaningful sense a trade union
act; (2) that their entry had some effect on Action Group policies; (3) that
the Action Group in fact "made an attempt to gain working class sup-
port"; and (4) that the governments of Nigeria responded to this attempt
by raising wages.
Not a single one of these assumptions is supportable from existing
knowledge of the history and dynamics of Nigerian politics during the
period under discussion. After 1950, what the radical intellectuals said or
did meant very little in Nigeria. They were a small and ineffectual group,
divorced from the mainstream of politics. Their influence in the trade union
movement was slight and uncertain. The fact that some of these intellec-
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tuals with trade union ties decided as individuals to join the Action Group
in 1954 implied very little, if anything, for the trade unions. Nor did the
entry of these few men into the Action Group have any apparent effect on
Action Group policies.
The statement that the Action Group "made an attempt to gain
working class support" is not meaningful. In a vague and general way, all
the parties were interested in getting votes of urban residents, including
wage earners. But this had nothing to do with the trade unions as political
institutions; political parties would be interested in worker votes even in
the absence of trade unions. The Action Group made few if any special
efforts to win over trade unions or their representatives. Aside from its
ethnic character (Yoruba), it was a party dominated by the professional
and business class.5 No more than the other main parties in Nigeria did it
take any concrete organizational initiatives aimed at the trade unions.
Indeed, the only specific step in this direction was made in the Northern
Region, where the Northern People's Congress organized and affiliated
the Northern Mine Worker's Union in 1954. By all objective indicators,
the political parties were almost wholly uninterested in trade unions during
these years and did not consider them as a significant political force. After
1950 there were no formal links between unions and political parties
except as noted above, in the North. Trade unionists, or people with even
some trade union background and experience, were extremely few on party
executive organs or in legislative bodies.6
It is the limited political presence of the trade unions, symbolized by
the slight contribution of the labor movement to party and elected leader-
ship, which led Sklar to conclude that "the only socioeconomic interest
group of major importance that is not assimilated into the effective party
system is organized labor." 7
A Nigerian trade unionist provides an interesting final comment on
the meaningfulness of Mr. Warren's statement that the 1954-55 wage
increases were "a defensive reaction," and one "directed deliberately
toward a situation known to be shaped and partly dominated by the trade
unions." He writes:
It should be clearly understood that the 1952 temporary award of
12-1/2% on salaries and wages, the 1954 Gorsuch salary review and the
1959 Mbanefo and other Regional Governments' awards were not the
fruits of our direct fight. Lack of unity in the movement made us shy of
the issues, and as a result, none of the awards could be favorably com-
pared with our 1945 and 1946 achievements. Rather, I might be right to
regard them as grudging acts of grace from the Government, or as a sort
of manna from Heaven.8
In two of the three postwar periods, then, real wages did not increase
at all, and in the third period (1950-56), the rise was due mainly to political
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competition unrelated to the trade unions. This leaves the war period to be
considered. My own view is that the apparent rise of real wages during the
wartime period is at least partly a statistical illusion, arising from under-
statement in the official price index of wartime price rises. Since I am the
assembler of the price series used by Warren, it would be bad form for me
to deny their validity. In defense, I will say only that it was with great
reluctance that I used the available figures for retail price changes in Lagos
during the war years, and that the dubious reliability of these figures is
twice stressed in my article. It is certain that consumer prices rose by more
than is indicated in the official index.9
As indicated in the tables given in my paper and used by Warren,
import prices in general rose by much more than the official consumer
price index. The "import purchasing power of wages" and the "textile
purchasing power" series suggest substantial declines in real wage incomes
during most of the war years. In any event, the data on prices are certainly
not strong enough to bear the weight Mr. Warren would put upon
them.
There none the less remains the puzzling question of why the wage
earner in Lagos received a wage increase in 1942 which was relatively large
by West African standards. Everywhere in West Africa, as in most parts
of the world, increases in consumer prices during World War II led to
money wage increases and cost of living supplements. But these increases
were especially large in Nigeria, and it is their greater magnitude (as com-
pared, say, with Ghana) which raises the possibility that special influences
such as trade union pressures were at work. Given the conceptual diffi-
culties involved in establishing lines of causation, and the rudimentary
state of knowledge of events of that period, it is not possible to rule out
some trade union influence. Union growth was rapid during this period,
and there were some strikes and agitation, notably among railroad workers.
But there is reason to be skeptical about the degree of trade union influence
in the wage decision of 1942. For one thing, if the unions were able to
pressure government into a generous wage award in 1942, why were they
unable to do the same between 1942 and 1945? After 1942 prices undoubt-
edly rose appreciably. Yet no wage adjustments were made until the end
of 1945. This occurred in spite of a promise by the governor of the time
that the cost of living would be kept under constant review, and that
allowances would be adjusted according to the rise in prices throughout
the war.10 This promise was not kept despite reminders by the unions and
trade union displeasure on this issue."
Are there alternative explanations of the magnitude of the 1942 wage
increase? There is one set of factors which, though neither neat nor
elegant, may have greater explanatory value than any other. The size of the
1942 increase may have been in a sense an accident, arising out of certain
procedures adopted by the committee appointed to inquire into the cost
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of living in 1942, coupled with administrative or political exigencies which
made rejection of the committee's recommendation difficult.
The 1942 wage increase was made on the recommendation of a Cost
of Living Committee (the Bridges Committee), which was appointed by the
Colonial administration to determine how much consumer prices had
risen since the beginning of World War II. It was understood that the
committee's findings would determine the size of the wage increase that
government would grant its unskilled employees.
On the basis of an elaborate study (of dubious technical validity),12
the committee found that the cost of living in Lagos had increased by 47
percent between 1939 and April 1942. They therefore recommended a cost
of living allowance of 50 percent of the basic wage. But the committee did
not stop there. It proceeded to confuse the "objective" issue of how much
price levels had increased with the normative issue of what the "minimum
needs" of the Lagos laborer were. On the basis of a "model minimum diet"
and related considerations, they recommended an additional increase
bringing the minimum rise in cost of living allowance in Lagos to one
shilling a day, on the grounds that two shillings a day was a reasonable
minimum subsistence income. Thus, the unskilled laborer in Lagos who
was up to that time earning a basic wage of one shilling a day saw his
starting rate doubled.13
Underlying this recommendation was a phenomenon common in the
wage determination process throughout the underdeveloped world: the
tendency for people who are appointed to commissions of inquiry, wage
boards, wage tribunals, etc., to be moved by the poverty of the lowest paid
urban wage earners, and for wage recommendations to reflect this humani-
tarian or moral impulse. The Bridges Committee recorded its reaction as
follows:
[We] have received overwhelming visual as well as oral evidence of the
poverty and difficult conditions of life of the labouring classes-and this,
of course, is no new discovery. In the present connection, the important
significance of these adverse conditions lies in their indication that the
labouring population generally lives from hand to mouth, with little or
no margin of earnings left after expenditure upon essentials-meals,
clothing, and a roof over their heads. Any increase in the cost of these
essentials, therefore, however small, must profoundly affect this class
of the population.14
Most of the answer to the 1942 wage puzzle probably lies here. The
Cost of Living Committee, moved by the evidence of urban poverty it saw
in Lagos, made a recommendation designed not simply to take account of
price increases, but also to raise the real income of unskilled workers to a
more "humane" level. The rationale for its recommendation was not only
that prices had risen, but that the Lagos laborer lived in conditions of
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extreme poverty, so that "social justice" and equity demanded a higher
real wage. In this sense, the 1942 Committee undoubtedly went beyond its
terms of reference.15 Once the recommendation was out, however, the
Colonial administration could not easily reject it, particularly since the
administrators were themselves not unmoved by these appeals to social
justice. And even if they were cold to such appeals, it was politically and
administratively difficult for them to reject the recommendations made by
the Cost of Living Committee.
We have thus far considered two of the subperiods during which Mr.
Warren argues that trade union political pressure pushed up real wage
levels-the 1939-46 years and the period 1950-55. The two periods when
real wages fell also require some attention. The years 1946-50 are particu-
larly interesting. If trade union political pressure or "defensive" govern-
ment wage policy were significant elements in determining wage changes,
it should have been evident during the period 1946-50. For in these years
consumer prices rose rapidly, nationalistic politics were at their peak of
intensity, and the trade unions and union leadership were involved in
political activity to an extent unmatched throughout the whole period. Yet
real wages fell sharply.
Mr. Warren's explanation is that the colonial authorities "adopted a
labor policy which identified labor issues with the political issues at a time
when the authorities regarded repression rather than concession as the
answer to nationalist politics." 16
This "explanation" is scarcely consistent with the general argument
that the labor movement's political influence induced government to raise
wages. It implies that the government's decision not to budge on wages
between 1946 and 1950 was determined autonomously; it was not influ-
enced by trade union activity.1 7 During the years when the Nigerian trade
unions were most politically committed, most effective and most influential,
the colonial administration ignored their wage demands and real wages fell
substantially.18 This striking conjuncture of events should have been
enough to suggest he need for caution in putting forward general proposi-
tions about the trade union ability to raise wage levels through the political
process.
In the second half of the 1950's, money wages again failed to keep
pace with consumer price rises. It is not impossible, and in fact seems likely,
that the trade union presence reduced the rate of increase of money wages
during these years. There is no objective evidence to prove this point. I
was told by high Labor Department officials in Lagos in 1958 that govern-
ment had been ready for many months to raise wages, but the trade union
representatives, at that time engaged in heated internal political struggles,
had been unable or unwilling to present wage demands to government.
Since a direct government initiative would only lead to demands for more
substantial increases, government simply waited. If this testimony is to be
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believed, then the unions were at least partly responsible for the wage
decline of the late 1950's.
There remains one final point. The assumption throughout Mr. Warren's
discussion is that real wages in Nigeria did in fact rise "substantially" or
"significantly" over the period he considers. The data, however, are hardly
persuasive on this point; over the period 1949-60 the mean annual wage
was only about 3 percent above its 1949 level; between 1949 and 1960 the
compound rate of increase was 1.6 percent. Whether this is or is not
"significant" is of course open to interpretation, but an average rise in the
level of real wages of 3 percent or an annual rate of increase of less than
2 percent cannot be called a major economic event. It is interesting that
between 1949 and 1960 real wages appear to have risen less in Nigeria than
in any of twelve African countries for which I have attempted to calculate
real wage series.19 And in a number of these countries trade unions were
either nonexistent or in an embryonic state (Congo, Southern Rhodesia,
and Uganda, for example). Neither in absolute terms, nor compared to
other countries in a similar stage of development, was the increase in real
wages in Nigeria between 1939 and 1960 impressive.
This analysis, then, leads to conclusions directly contrary to those put
forward by Mr. Warren. Real wages rose relatively little in Nigeria
between 1939 and 1960, substantially less than in other African countries
where there was only a slight trade union presence and where market
factors do not seem to have been appreciably different than in Nigeria.
To the extent that real wages did rise, trade union political pressures-
actual or potential-had relatively little to do with it; the main direct
union impact on wage levels (mentioned by Warren and not challenged
in this note) was in extending government wage awards to the private
sector.
When real wages rise in a situation where market forces are unfavor-
able, it is natural enough to see trade union activity as a major influence.
But in most of the underdeveloped world the trade unions are too weak to
have much of an influence on wage levels. The tendency to focus on them
has diverted attention from what are probably the more basic and general
factors-the ideological or intellectual environment which shapes the
ideas of policy makers, and the nature of decision-making in the public
sectors of the less developed countries. Thus, wage behavior cannot be
explained without understanding the role of prevailing ideas of social
justice and "fair" wages, and without taking into account he administra-
tive process by which wages are fixed. Economic factors are not irrelevant
either, though they tend to operate mainly in a permissive sense, and at
the extremes; budget stringency tends to restrain wages and budgetary
affluence makes them possible. Nor are trade union pressures altogether
absent, as events in Nigeria in 1964 (when trade union activity did lead to
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a wage increase) indicate. In general, however, and certainly in the case of
Nigeria between 1939 and 1960, trade unions are a minor factor in wage
determination.
1 W. M. Warren, "Urban Real Wages and the Nigerian Trade Union Move-
ment, 1939-60," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. 15, No. 1
(October 1966), p. 21.
2 Ibid., pp. 33-36.
3 P. 31. Warren cites Richard Sklar's exhaustive study of Nigerian politics,
Nigerian Political Parties (Princeton, 1963). Sklar in the pages cited by Warren
mentions these facts, but his discussion shows the political isolation and
powerlessness both of the trade unions and of the radicals in Nigeria during
these years.
4 Ibid., p. 270. It is interesting to note that between 1951 and 1955, man-days
lost through work stoppages fell sharply as compared with the preceding five
years. In terms of man-days lost, strike activities were as follows: 1951-
10,000; 1952-69,000; 1953-13,000; 1954-23,000; 1955-10,000. For the
1946-50 figures, see note 18 below. I am indebted to John Weeks of the
University of Michigan for this point.
5 Sklar, op. cit., Ch. XI.
6 Of the 211 federal leaders of the three main parties in 1958, only eight were
in the category "agents of cultural and political associations," among whom
trade union officials would be placed; only four had a background of wage-
earning manual labor. Sklar, op. cit., p. 486. In the 1954 election which pre-
ceded ministerial government throughout Nigeria, of the total of 425'elected
members of the four legislative assemblies, eight were trade unionists by
occupation, and "It is difficult to know whether these got in in their capacity
as trade unionists." A. Akpala, The Prospects of Small Trade Unions in Nigeria
(Enugu, 1963), p. 26. Of the 84 Eastern and Western Region members in the
1957 Federal House of Representatives, only three had any trade union experi-
ence at all-or at least enough to think it worth mentioning in their official
biographies. Who's Who of the Federal House of Representatives (Lagos, 1958).
7 Sklar, op. cit., p. 495.
8 Eyo Okun Aka, Our Labour Movement (Lagos, 1963), p. 24.
9 E. Berg, "Real Income Trends in West Africa, 1939-1960," in M. Hers-.
kovitz and M. Harwitz, eds., Economic Transition in Africa (Northwestern
University Press, 1964), pp. 203-10. As so often happens, the need to shorten
the original draft of this article led to the dropping of certain footnotes and a
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deletion of hesitant passages. It may be of interest to give one of the deleted
footnotes:
According to the official Lagos cost of living index prices during the war
changed as follows:
General
Date index Food Rent
Sept. 1939 100 100 100
April 1942 147 153 103
April 1943 159 167 106
April 1944 161 160 106
April 1945 176 185 111
Oct. 1945 175 184 111
The general practice in compiling the index was to take official prices, not
actual prevailing market prices. Thus, there were some periods when certain
foodstuffs disappeared almost entirely from Lagos markets; this is not reflected
in the food price quotations. The rent item is obviously unbelievable; African
trade union representatives claimed a rise of 400 percent had occurred in low-
cost house rents between 1939 and 1945. See Colonial Office Enquiry to the Cost
of Living and the Control of the Cost of Living in the Colony and Protectorate of
Nigeria, Colonial No. 204 (London, 1946).
10 Report of the Cost of Living Committee (Lagos, 1942), p. 93.
11 Cf. Agwu Akpala, The Prospects of Small Trade Unions in Nigeria (Enugu,
1963), p. 21.
12 The study was done by "volunteers ... friends of the members of the
committee ... [who were asked to] distribute and collect forms for a survey
of household budgets." Cost of Living Committee (1942), op. cit., p. 96. A
thousand questionnaires were distributed on 100 streets in Lagos. Of these, 256
were useable-"useable" being very generously defined. There were substantial
difficulties in obtaining meaningful price quotations.
13 It is illuminating to see how the committee arrived at these recommenda-
tions. In part for normative reasons, and in part because of uncertainties
regarding actual consumer expenditure patterns, the committee priced a
laborer's "model minimum diet" as proposed by dieticians. Its cost had risen,
they found, from 10d a day in July 1940 to 1/1d in June 1942. They then
proceeded to determine an "appropriate" wage as follows: they first decided
that the laborer probably devoted about a quarter of his wage income to the
support of his family. So, of the prevailing wage of 1 shilling a day, he had 9d
for himself. The committee then assumed that the laboter spent 50 percent of
this for food. It deducted this 4.5d from the cost of the model minimum diet
616
Elliot J. Berg
(1/1d), which yielded the "right" amount to be granted as a wage increase-i.e.,
8.5d. But this still left unaccounted for the rise in cost of other items of expendi-
ture. It was assumed that nonfood expenditure had risen by 40 percent since
1939; 40 percent of nonfood expenditure, assumed to be half the daily wages of
1 shilling, gave 2.5d. An additional 0.75d was added for increased costs for the
rest of the household. The committee thus arrived at a final cost of living allow-
ance of 8.5d plus 2.5d plus 0.75d, rounded off to 1 shilling.
14 1942 Cost of Living Committee, p. 96.
15 An additional factor may have been the interim award made by the
government while the Committee was sitting. This award was equal to the
price rise as determined by the Committee. Since it is not "normal" for a cost
of living committee to recommend no rise, the members may have felt com-
pelled to add something more.
16 Warren, op. cit., p. 28.
17 To the extent that political involvement of the unions led the colonial
administration to identify labor issues with political issues, then one could
argue that the effect was to reduce real wages.
18 This occurred despite relatively intensive strike activity. Man-days lost
through strikes were as follows: 1946-51,000; 1947-134,000; 1948-61,000;
1949-581,000; 1950-294,000. As can be seen from comparable data for
1951-55 (note 4 above), these are relatively high figures.
19 Unpublished manuscript.
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